ABSTRACT: We setup a model in which the residents of two neighboring municipalities can use the services provided by public infrastructures located in both jurisdictions. If services are either complements or substitutes in use, the municipalities strategically interact when investing in infrastructures; moreover, when they differ in population size, the small municipality reacts more to the expenditure of its neighbor than the big one. The theoretical predictions are then tested by estimating the determinants of the stock of public infrastructures of the municipalities belonging to the Autonomous Province of Trento, in Italy.
Introduction
Is the provision of public infrastructures by a local jurisdiction affected by that of its neighbors? And how is the effect (if any) related to the size of local jurisdictions in terms of population? A proper answer to these questions can give an important contribution to the discussion about the optimal boundaries of areas over which public infrastructures are provided. In fact, this is a hot topic in Europe, where some countries are rethinking the structure of their public sector (in terms of both the number and the types of government layers) by relying on two main theoretical arguments, namely the presence of scale economies and of positive spillovers in infrastructures provision, both pointing at inefficient levels of infrastructure provision by local jurisdictions that are too small in size. 1 The theoretical literature on fiscal externalities recognizes that there are various ways in which decisions taken in one jurisdiction may spill-over into other jurisdictions. 2 Fiscal policies of regional governments can directly affect the welfare of residents in neighboring jurisdictions, as for expenditures on public goods and services (e.g., environmental policies) whose benefits transcend borders. Public policies in one region can also indirectly affect residents elsewhere through their impact on local governments' budgets, giving rise to the so-called fiscal externalities (e.g., tax policies that induce tax base mobility across jurisdictions). Case et al. (1993) is the first systematic empirical work addressing these issues; using data on expenditures of continental US States over the period [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] , they find that state government's per capita expenditure is positively and significantly affected by that of its neighbors'. Other important studies are Murdoch et al. (1993) and Solé-Ollé (2006) , showing that public expenditure spillovers are stronger at low levels of government's layers than at high levels.
There is also a growing literature on fiscal externalities specifically related to the provision of local infrastructures. Cremer et al. (1997) modelling the provision of local infrastructures in a federation in which two communities strategically interact by comparing the per capita cost of providing infrastructures with the transport cost that their own citizens must bear to go and enjoy the infrastructures provided by the neighboring community. For given production and transport costs, the decision to provide 1 In the celebrated Decentralization Theorem by Oates (1972) , the exploitation of scale economies and the internalization of spillovers account for the benefits of centralization, while uniform public goods provision in the presence of heterogenous preferences at the local level account for its costs.
2 For a comprehensive analysis of the issue, see, e.g., Dahlby (1996) .
infrastructures depends on the size of the community. Haughwout (2002) proposes a spatial equilibrium model by considering the role of infrastructures in determining the distribution of economic activity across regions. The empirical evidence suggests that central cities' land prices are positively related with public infrastructures provision;
however, as the same author points out, the omission from the model of the costs and benefits of spillovers might be one of the main causes of the limited local infrastructure benefits found in the empirical analysis. Buettner et al. (2004) , by using German data on public expenditure of Lander governments, find that the agglomeration level has no effect on the per capita expenditure on infrastructures; in particular, there is no cost disadvantage, both for highly urbanized and for sparsely populated regions. Also in this case, however, one might argue that the results are driven by the assumption of no spatial interaction between local infrastructures. In fact, if spatial autocorrelation turns out to be an important expenditure determinant, not accounting for it can yield biased and inconsistent estimates for many of the determinants of the expenditure equation (Case et al., 1993; Revelli, 2002) .
In our work, to set the stage for the empirical analysis, we build up a simple theoretical model in which two neighboring local jurisdictions independently provide public infrastructures. If local infrastructures can be consumed by the citizens of both jurisdictions, the model shows that each local government increases (respectively, reduces) its expenditure on infrastructures in response to an increase in its neighbor's expenditure if local infrastructures are complements (respectively, substitutes) in use by citizens.
Public infrastructures like roads, bridges, or dams, are examples of complement infrastructures, since they share the property that their benefits from use are higher if also the neighboring jurisdictions provide the same type of infrastructures on their territory.
If two neighboring jurisdictions provide good roads, and if roads are not used only for local trips (i.e., confined within the boundaries of a given jurisdiction) but also for inter-jurisdictional trips, then the benefits from road usage are higher for the residents of both jurisdictions than in the case in which only one of them provides good roads.
In this sense, local roads, like other types of infrastructures, can be complement in use.
On the contrary, public facilities like theaters, libraries, or sport grounds, are examples of substitute infrastructures, since the citizens of a given jurisdiction can use either the facilities provided in their own jurisdiction or those provided in the neighboring jurisdictions, but never both at the same time.
The theoretical model also shows that, in per capita terms, the size of the reaction of expenditure on infrastructures to changes in the expenditure by the neighboring jurisdiction is decreasing, in absolute value, in the size of the local jurisdiction. That is, in per capita terms a highly populated jurisdiction hardly reacts to changes in infrastructures of a scarcely populated neighbor, since any given change in the per capita expenditure of a small jurisdiction has a negligible per capita impact, in terms of public goods spillovers, on the residents of a large jurisdiction.
In the empirical analysis, we use a dataset containing financial and socioeconomic variables for the 223 municipalities belonging to the Italian Autonomous Province of
Trento. After constructing a measure of the stock of infrastructures provided by municipalities, we estimate their determinants by explicitly introducing a spatial lag-error component. We find robust evidence that some types of public infrastructures are of the complement type, since in small municipalities their level is positively affected by the level of infrastructures provided by the neighboring communities. However, and in accordance with our theoretical predictions, the spatial interaction tends to vanish for large municipalities.
The work is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 outlines the estimation strategy and discusses the results.
Section 5 concludes.
The theoretical model
Consider a regional economy composed of two municipalities, labelled i = 1, 2. 3 Let N i be the population resident in jurisdiction i, and y i its per-capita endowment of income, exogenously given. Income is used to consume private and local public goods, the latter financed with a local income tax. We assume that individuals cannot change their place of residence, although they can move to consume the public good provided in the neighboring municipality.
Consider, without loss of generality, community 1. The utility function of the rep-3 The fact of limiting the analysis to the case of only two jurisdictions obviously implies that each one of them is 'the neighbor' of the other one. We adopt such a simplified setup for analytical convenience.
A richer, but also more complex, specification is that of the 'circular region', a formalization akin to that used in spatial models of product differentiation, in which the local jurisdictions are located along a circle, so that each one of them has two neighbors, one at its left and one at its right of the regional territory (see Solé-Ollé, 2006 , for an application of such a type of framework).
resentative individual resident in municipality 1 is:
where z i denotes the effective service-level of public infrastructures provided by municipality i on its territory, and x 1 the consumption of private goods. The parameters ↵ i > 0 and i > 0 are a measure of the intensity of preferences for the consumption of public and private goods, respectively. 4
The utility function (1) also contains two parameters, ✓ 2 [0, 1] and 2 [ 1, 1], which are key for the analysis, and that are assumed to be identical in the two jurisdictions. The parameter ✓ represents a classical positive spillover of local public goods provision; at one end, ✓ = 1 implies full spillover; at the other end, ✓ = 0 implies no spillovers. 5 A first interpretation is that a share ✓ of the residents in jurisdiction 1 fully enjoy the public infrastructures located in jurisdiction 2. A second interpretation is that all residents in jurisdiction 1 enjoy at a ✓% rate the public infrastructures located in jurisdiction 2.
The parameter measures instead the degree of complementarity (if positive) or substitutability (if negative) in the use of public infrastructures provided by the two jurisdictions. 6 For instance, road services provided by the two municipalities are complement in usage if drivers (e.g., commuters, or shoppers) must cross the border in a typical journey: in this case, it is ✓ > 0, > 0. Two swimming pools, one located in each municipality, are instead likely to be substitutes in usage: in this case, it is ✓ > 0, < 0. Finally, it is also possible that services provided are neither complements nor substitutes; in this case, it is ✓ > 0, = 0. For instance, a swimming pool in one 4 Heterogeneity between jurisdictions in terms of the preference parameters ↵i and i can be due to geographical factors, demographic factors (e.g., the share of elderly in total population), characteristics of the local economy, and so on. 5 In line with the prevalent literature, we assume that the spillover is automatically determined by the provision of local infrastructures. It is possible to extend our framework to the more realistic case in which the effective level of enjoyment depends on usage levels, endogenously chosen by individuals of the two jurisdictions. 6 Most models analyzing local public goods spillovers assume that the total amount of public goods enjoyed by the residents of any given jurisdiction is equal to a weighted sum of the 'home' and the 'neighbors' public goods supplies, which means that the public goods provided by different jurisdictions are perfect substitutes (in our model, this case is obtained by setting = 1). The more general functional form of the utility function given in Eq. (1) is widely used in oligopolistic models with product differentiation (see, e.g., Singh and Vives, 1984) .
jurisdiction, and a public library in the other one, are likely to be independent in usage by the residents of both jurisdictions.
In any given jurisdiction i, the per-capita effective service-level of public infrastructures depends on total expenditure, E i , and on the total number of users,Ñ i , according to the function: 7
where r 2 [0, 1] andÑ
Consistently with the utility function defined in Eq. (1), Eq. (3) shows that public infrastructures provided in a given jurisdiction are fully enjoyed by all its residents and by a share ✓ of the residents in the neighboring jurisdiction or, alternatively, that they are fully enjoyed by all its residents while they are enjoyed at a reduced ✓% rate by all non-residents. In Eq. (2), the parameter r, which is identical for the two jurisdictions, captures the degree of congestion in the use of public infrastructures. At one end, r = 0 implies non rivalry in the use of public services; at the other end, r = 1 implies that public services are fully rival. Note that while the parameter r defines the degree of rivalness in consumption within the boundaries of the jurisdiction in which the public good is provided, the spillover parameter ✓ defines the degree of non-rivalness in spatial terms, so that ✓ = 0 defines a purely local good whereas ✓ = 1 defines a purely 'national' good.
Let t i be the per capita local tax and g i an unconditional grant, in per-capita terms, received by municipality i from an upper tier of government (e.g., the regional government). By substituting the local government budget constraint,
into the representative individual's budget constraint, x i = y i t i , we obtain the local economy resource constraint:
Investment in public infrastructures
Local policy makers simultaneously and independently set their own expenditures on infrastructures with the aim of maximizing the welfare of the representative resident.
7 Note that the specification given in Eq. (2), by which the stock variable z1 is a function of the flow variable Ei, implicitly assumes full depretiation of the expenditure in infrastructures within the time period. That is, we consider a simple static model instead of a more complex dynamic framerwork.
Formally, and considering, without loss of generality, municipality 1, the policy maker chooses public expenditure E 1 to maximize Eq. (1), subject to Eqs. (2) and (4) for i = 1, taking as given the public expenditure E 2 of municipality 2. The first order condition of the given problem is:
that can be written as:
By solving Eq. (5) with respect to E 1 , we obtain the best response (or reaction)
function:
The second order sufficient condition for a maximum holds true, since:
A similar best response function, denoted byẼ 2 (E 1 , N 2 , N 1 ), can be obtained for municipality 2. By combining the two functions, one can solve for the Nash equilibrium in the public expenditure levels of the two municipalities. 8 We characterize the factors that determine the sign and the size of the slope of the reaction function (6). In fact, the latter represents the key interaction effect for the expenditure decisions of local governments that we try to assess in our empirical analysis.
The slope of the reaction function
By linearity of the best response function (6), it is immediate to obtain its slope as:
Provided that the benefits of public infrastructures spill-over across jurisdictions (i.e., ✓ > 0), Eq. (7) shows that the sign of the slope of the reaction function is determined by the sign of the parameter , expressing complementarity (when positive) or substitutability (when negative) of public infrastructures services in the neighboring jurisdictions. The following proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 1 Assume that local infrastructures services spill-over across jurisdictions (i.e., ✓ > 0). If the services provided by the two jurisdictions are complements in consumption by citizens (i.e., > 0), then the best response function relating the optimal public expenditure levels of one jurisdiction to the public expenditure levels of the other jurisdiction is positively sloped. It is instead negatively sloped if the services provided by the two jurisdictions are substitutes in consumption (i.e., < 0).
Quite obviously, if public services provided by the two jurisdictions are neither complements nor substitutes in use (i.e., = 0), then public expenditure in each jurisdiction is independent of that in the other jurisdiction, even in the presence of positive spillovers.
The role of population size
In this section we explore how the population size affects the terms of the strategic interaction between the two local governments. Let e i = E i /N i denote per capita public expenditure in jurisdiction i. Expressed in per capita terms, the slope of the best response function is equal to:
Using Eqs. (7) and (3), the latter expression can be written as:
We are interested in examining how the size of the slope shown in Eq. (8) is affected by changes in N 1 , for given N 2 , by focusing on some specific, but relevant, cases. In particular, assuming maximal spillovers (i.e., ✓ = 1), we consider in turn the two 'polar' cases of services that are fully non-rival (i.e., r = 0) and fully rival (i.e., r = 1) in consumption.
If ✓ = 1 and r = 0, then Eq. (8) reduces to:
Eq. (9) shows that, for given and N 2 , the slope of the best response function is, in absolute value, decreasing in N 1 > 1, since:
= N 2 , where =
Substituting for ✓ = 1 and r = 1 into Eq. (8), and then differentiating with respect to N 1 , we get:
The latter expression shows that, for given and N 2 , the slope of the best response function is, in absolute value, decreasing in N 1 , provided that
jurisdiction 1 is not too small relative to the neighboring jurisdiction 2.
The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 
The intuition behind these results is simple. In per capita terms, a large jurisdiction has little incentives to react to changes in the infrastructures level by a small neighboring community, as any given change in the per capita expenditure of the latter brings about benefit spillovers to the residents in the large community that are, in per capita terms, very small. 9
The empirical analysis
The model presented in the previous section is tested by using a dataset on the 223 municipalities belonging to the Italian Autonomous Province of Trento. Italy counts 9 Although no analytical solutions are available for the general case in which r 2 (0, 1) and ✓ < 1, by means of numerical simulations it is possible to show that the results of Proposition 2 are robust. In particular, for r sufficiently close to zero, the slope of the best response function is, in absolute value, decreasing in N1, for given N2. Instead, for r sufficiently close to 1, it is decreasing in N1 provided that N1 is above a given thresholdN , withN < N2. Details of the simulations are available from upon request. At the municipal level, own revenues include a property tax and a range of userfees, 11 while provincial transfers are in part of the 'specific' type (i.e., targeted to specific expenditure functions) and in part of the 'general' type, with the latter allocated by means of formulas based on fiscal needs and fiscal capacities of the municipalities.
On the expenditure side, budgetary data distinguish between 'recurrent' and 'capital' outlays. Our focus is on the latter type of expenditures, since they build up over time the stock of public infrastructures.
Data and variables
The main variable in the dataset is the yearly capital expenditure, in real terms, 12 for the 223 municipalities over the period 1990-2007, divided into 12 functions that reflect investments on different types of infrastructures. We also collected data on the capital transfers granted by the Province of Trento to its municipalities, since this source of 10 Italy counts five Autonomous Regions (Sicily and Sardinia, which are insular territories, and Valle d'Aosta, Trentino Alto-Adige, and Friuli Venezia-Giulia, which are northern boundary territories) and two Autonomus Provinces (Trento and Bolzano, making up the Trentino Alto-Adige Region). 11 For the period covered by our study, the main local tax at the municipal level is ICI (Imposta Comunale sugli Immobili), which is based on the cadastral value of real estates and on the market value of building lots. Minor taxes include a surcharge on the personal income tax and a surcharge on the tax on electricity consumption. User charges include waste collection and fees for public services such as public transport, nursery schools, and so on. 12 We used the 2007 base year deflator for gross fixed capital formation computed by the "Autorità per l'Energia" (www.autorita.energia.it).
revenues is an important determinant of investment outlays. 13 The provincial capital transfers are in part of the specific type (i.e., earmarked to specific infrastructural projects in one of the 12 expenditure functions) and in part of the general type (usually formula-based, with reference to measures of fiscal needs and fiscal capacities). 14 We build a measure of the municipal capital stock (i.e., the endowment of infrastructures) by applying the perpetual inventory method (see, e.g. Goldsmith, 1951; Meinen et al., 1998) , according to which the capital stock at time t is assumed to be equal to the capital stock at time t 1, net of depreciation (if any), plus gross investment 13 There is also a well known literature on the effects of grants on public expenditure, usually finding that grants can stimulate government expenditures more than monetary transfers to individuals of the same amount (Gramlich, 1977) . Hence, a quota of the federal money sticks to the public sector instead of being distributed to citizens (the so-called flypaper effect ). Interestingly, Wyckoff (1991) 
Moran I statistic 0.14*** 0.08** 0.18*** 0.06*
Notes:
The spatial matrix used to compute the Moran test is a binary, contiguity-based one, according to which two municipalities are neighbors if they share a border, and is row-standardized. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
Turning to the control variables, we build up a measure of the provincial capital grants (grants) using the same method outlined above for the capital stock. As for the other variables, the dataset includes demographic, territorial and socioeconomic data that can be relevant determinants of infrastructural stocks. The average altitude level, we include the population growth rate (growth), defined as the percentange difference between the population average in 2001-2007 and that in 1991-1997. 16 A peculiarity of the Province is the presence of 16 'communities', each one formed by several contiguous municipalities belonging to an homogenous geographic and economic area. By means of their community, the municipalities jointly provide some public services that benefit the whole area covered by the community, thus realizing some economies of scale and spillover internalization. Since the community of affiliation can bear some weight in the investment decisions of a municipality, we include as a control a dummy variable for each community (communities dummy).
In order to control for the outliers, we compute the interquartile range (IQR) for all the dependent variables, picking up those observations (outliers) passing over the left or right boundary and defining accordingly a dummy variable (outliers dummy). 17
Finally, we define a dummy variable (metropolitan dummy), equal to one for the two most populated cities in the Province, which are Trento (about 110,000 inhabitants)
and Rovereto (about 35,000 inhabitants). These are by far the biggest cities, since the other 221 municipalities have an average population of about 1,600 inhabitants.
Summary statistics, data description and data sources of all the variables used in the analysis are reported in Appendix A, Tables A1 and A2, while Table A3 provides the list of municipalities outliers. 16 The years 1991 and 2001 are the census years and 2007 is the last year of the dataset. 17 We used the IQR stata command, which allows for the detection of both mild and severe ouliers.
Estimation of the standard empirical model of public expenditure through a linear specification might not take into account expenditures and or economic shocks in neighboring municipalities which can be correlated with exogenous controls and so lead to biased and inconsistent estimates of the parameters (Case et al., 1993; Revelli, 2002) . Therefore, before deciding upon the econometric strategy, we need to know whether the data present spatial dependence among municipalities.
To do so we first need to define spatial variables. We build a matrix of neighbors to each municipality based upon their geographical location, which can be expressed through a (223⇥223) matrix, such that the element corresponding to row a and column b is 1 if the spatial units a and b are geographically neighbors, and zero otherwise. We then make a row standardization such that the elements of each row sum to one; note also that, since all neighbors have the same weight, all elements of a row are identical.
Hence, the product of the (223 ⇥ 223) matrix by the (223 ⇥ 1) vector of expenditure levels yields for each municipality a simple average of its neighboring municipalities expenditure.
We compute the traditional measure of spatial dependence that is the Moran's spatial statistics (Cliff and Ord, 1981; Anselin, 1988) Table 2 shows, all our variables of interest exibit a spatial pattern of postive autocorrelation that is stronger for both expenditures in Total Infrastructures and Roads and Transport. 
However, the result of the Moran test is unable to descriminate properly between spatial-lag and spatial-error dependence. 18 Hence, in order to obtain a more precise 18 There are two primary types of spatial dependence. The spatial error dependence occurs when the error terms across different spatial units are correlated. In this case the OLS assumption of uncorrelated error terms is violated and hence the estimates are biased. Spatial error is due to omitted (spatially indication of which is the most likely source of spatial dependence, we perform the two robust Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests proposed by Anselin et al. (1996) , 19 which are based on the OLS residuals of a non-spatial regression model, using all the control variables described in Section 3.1. 
Strategic interaction evidence
Using the per-capita neighbors' average expenditure, we first estimate the OLS coefficients (Table 3 , columns 1, 3, 5 and 7). Moreover, since the spatial tests shown above suggest the presence of different patterns of spatial dependence for the four infrastructural measures we focus on, we perform a three-step procedure developed by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) to estimate a spatial autoregressive model with autoregressive disturbance (Table 3 , columns 2, 4, 6 and 8) taking into account both the source of spatial dependence (spatial-lag and spatial-error) by using as instruments the average of all correlated) covariates that, if not attended, would bias the estimate. Spatial error models sort out of the problem by estimating the coefficient of the spatial error. The spatial lag dependence implies that the dependent variable y in jurisdiction i is affected by independent variables of jurisdiction i and j and hence the dependent variable of j also affects it, and vice-versa. The assumption of uncorrelated error terms and independent observations is violated and therefore the regression estimates are biased.
The solution to this puzzle can be that of instrumenting the endogenous spatial lag (i.e., the dependent variable of j entering in the estimate of the dependent variable of i).
19 Both LM-statistics are Chi-Square distibuted with one degree of freedom.
neighbor's exogenous variables and correcting for heteroskedasticity of unknown form (GS2SLS Robust; see Drukker et al., 2010 Drukker et al., , 2011 , for details).
The estimated spatial lag coefficient, , for Total Infrastructures is 0.17 and 1% significant while the spatial error coefficient, ⇢, is not significant (Table 3, (1), (3) , (5) and (7) display OLS robust estimator results by using, respectively, total per-capita expenditure, administration and management per-capita expenditure, road and traffic per-capita expenditure and planning and environment per-capita expenditure as dependent variables. Columns (2), (4) , (6) and (8) show the spatial lag-error model estimation results by using GS2SLS (Generalized method of moment and instrumental variables) robust estimator correcting for heteroskedasticity issues of unknown form. The spatial weight matrix (W) used is of the type: contiguity-based and it is row-standardized. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
The impact of the population size
In this section we extend our empirical analysis by interacting the average of neighbor's per capita expenditure with the population. 20 We first estimate a spatial model in which we account for the interaction term by OLS (Table 4 , columns 1, 4, 7 and 10). 21 We then use the GS2SLS estimator (Table 4 , columns 2, 5, 8 and 11) where we account only for the endogeneity issue of the spatial parameter, but we do not instrument its interaction with the population. In order to check whether the results obtained from GS2SLS regression are robust to possible endogenity bias due to the interaction term we also include, as additional instruments, the product of the neighbor's exogenous variables with population (columns 3, 6, 9 and 12, Table 4 cantly different from zero in all three specifications. We also find evidence of horizontal spending spillovers for Planning & Environment, since turns out to be significantly different from zero at 10% in the specification when we instrument only for neighbor's infrastructure (col. 11) and in the specification when both neighbor's infrastructure and the product of neighbors'infrastructure with population are instrumented (col. 12).
In columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 4 we find evidence that the externality effect on Total Infrastructures is driven by population (in fact the intercation term neighbors spending*population is equal to 0.39, 5% significant in the specification in column 1; 0.45, 1% significant in the specification in column 2; 0.39, 5% significant in the specification in column 3), and then, inspecting more in detail we observe that this result is entirely due to the Roads & Transport expenditure function (columns 20 To test the robustness of our results, we have also taken into account the relative size of a municipality with respct to its neighbors by interacting the average of neighbor's per capita expenditure with the ratio between population and the average of neighbor's population, finding no changes in the results. Results are available upon request. 21 The results of the non-spatial regression model are reported in Table A5 .
7, 8 and 9), for which the interaction term is negative ( 1.17, 1% singificant in the specification in column 7; 1.23, 1% significant in the specification in column 8 and 
Notes:
Columns (1), (4), (7) and (10) display OLS robust estimator results by using, respectively, total per-capita expenditure, administration and management per-capita expenditure, road and traffic per-capita expenditure and planning and environment per-capita expenditure as dependent variables. Columns (2), (5), (8) and (11) show the spatial lag-error model estimation results by using GS2SLS (Generalized method of moment and instrumental variables) robust estimator correcting for heteroskedasticity issues of unknown form. Columns (3), (6), (9) and (12) 
(8) Population divided by area.
APPENDIX

ISTAT Our computation
Total Employees Local Unit
Outliers Dummy
Metropolitan Dummy
Number of public and private employees in 2001 divided by population.
Number of local productive unit in 2001 divided by population.
Outliers dummy=1 if the municipality is an outliers with respect to per capita expenditure. See Table A3 .
Metropolitan dummy=1 if the municipality is either Trento or Rovereto. Notes: The spatial matrix used to compute the neighboring variables is a binary contiguity-based one, according to which two municipalities are neighbors if they share a border, and is row-standardized Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. The spatial weights matrix used to compute the test is a binary, contiguity-based one, according to which two municipalities are neighbors if they share a common border and it is row-standardized. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
